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Universal Jurisdiction between Unity and Fragmentation of International
Criminal Law1
Maria Antonella Pasculli•
Riassunto
Nel mio lavoro si esamina se il tema della giurisdizione universale conduca all’unità o alla frammentazione del diritto
penale internazionale.
Dopo alcuni cenni sulla letteratura in materia, verranno valutati gli elementi a favore e quelli contro l’implementazione
del principio di giurisdizione universale. Successivamente, il principio della giurisdizione universale, inteso da taluni
come controversa forma di giurisdizione, verrà esaminato relativamente a quei Paesi che hanno diversamente legiferato
in materia, per focalizzare l’attenzione sulla sua efficacia e legittimità.
Nella prima sezione sarà fornita una panoramica degli Stati che, in ossequio alla ratificazione dello Statuto di Roma,
hanno risolto il problema dell’universalità della giurisdizione in materia penale secondo forme e modalità differenti.
Nella seconda sezione, attraverso una panoramica dei casi giurisprudenziali, verrà tracciata una possibile linea di
unificazione della tematica a partire dal rispetto del principio di legalità, anche da un punto di vista internazionalistico, e
facendo riferimento alla identificazione formale e sostanziale delle fattispecie per cui potrebbe applicarsi il principio. Il
legame più forte di unità è dato sicuramente dalla definizione dei crimini internazionali presenti nelle varie convenzioni
e nello Statuto di Roma.
La conclusione richiama una personale interpretazione della giurisdizione universale in chiave di globalizzazione
sociologica.
Résumé
Dans cet article, la question que nous allons aborder est celle de la juridiction universelle, de manière à comprendre si
elle conduira à l’unité ou à la fragmentation du droit pénal international.
Sur la base d’un bref aperçu de la littérature sur le sujet, on évaluera le pour et le contre de l’implémentation du principe
de juridiction universelle. Après quoi, afin de porter notre attention sur l’efficacité et la légitimité du principe de
juridiction universelle, défini aussi comme une forme de juridiction controversée, on l’examinera dans les pays qui ont
légiféré différemment en la matière.
Dans la première partie du texte, on donnera un aperçu des Etats qui, par respect pour la ratification du Statut de Rome,
ont résolu le problème de l’universalité de la juridiction en droit pénal selon différentes formes et modalités.
Dans la deuxième partie, à travers quelques cas de jurisprudence, on essayera de répondre à la question suivante : les
Etats, dans l’implémentation de leur propre législation et, par conséquent, leur tribunaux nationaux, utilisent-ils les
mêmes définitions de crime employées par la Cour Pénale Internationale ? Ou, au contraire, adaptent-ils ces définitions
aux circonstances nationales ?
Pour conclure, l’auteur développera des considerations sur l’utilité de la juridiction universelle d’un point de vue de
mondialisation sociologique.
Abstract
This paper represents the outcome of research fellowship Marie Curie at the Universiteit Leiden -Campud Den Haag
Grotius, Centre for International Legal Studies (prof. C. Stahn and prof. Larissa van den Herik, supervisors) on the topic
"The Fragmentation and the Diversification of International Criminal Law in a Global Society”.
In my paper I will examine the question of whether Universal Jurisdiction (UJ) leads to unity or fragmentation within
International Criminal Law (ICL). Given that there is already quite a lot of literature on UJ, it is important to focus the
research on the issue of fragmentation and/or unity rather than to deal with the issue of UJ more generally. I will focus
on this topic in sections 1 and 2, explaining some cursory remarks to these issues in my analysis on fragmentation.
 In the introduction, I will briefly introduce UJ as a controversial form of jurisdiction, but still necessary given that
territorial jurisdiction does not always function well in the case of international crime. I will demonstrate that many
state parties to the International Criminal Court (ICC) Statute have vested or reconfirmed UJ for the core crimes when
implementing the ICC Statute. The leading question of my research is whether this practice has led or has the potential
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to lead to unity or rather to fragmentation within ICL. In the research I will approach this question from different
perspectives.
In section 1 I will examine how State parties have may actually enacted universal jurisdiction for the core crimes, with a
view to determining whether there is indeed some unity on this front or whether the practice on this matter is actually
rather diverse (or fragmented). Subsequently, I will analyse which conditions States have formulated for the exercise of
UJ, and whether this practice is consistent (unity) or again rather diverse (fragmentation). It might also be interesting to
see whether States have different conditions for UJ over core crimes than over other international or transnational
crimes, which would be a sign of real fragmentation between modern ICL (the core crimes) and transnational ICL
(crimes such as terrorism, piracy, money counterfeiting, etc.).
In section 2, on the basis of a few selected case studies, I will ask whether the exercise of UJ has the tendency to lead to
fragmented jurisprudence on substantive ICL. I will try to answer: Do States in their implementation of legislation and
subsequently the national courts use the same crime definitions as the ICC, or are they generally different and tailored
to domestic circumstances? And those questions arise even more strongly for modes of liability? If the latter is the case,
to what extent is the jurisprudence fragmented – is it on minor points, or do we see great divergences in case law on
crime definitions?
Finally, I will make some final observations on the utility of UJ and whether in general it will lead to further
fragmentation within ICL, with my personal interpretation of ideal UJ.
1. Introduction. The historical foundations
and the philosophical underpinnings of
Universal Juridiction (UJ). Can and should the
UJ be exercised for the prosecution of
individuals responsible for gross and serious
violations of human rights?
The general concept of jurisdiction means a legal
authority that enables the States to apply the penal
law, in the area in which this power can be used.
This area is represented by the territory of the
States. Criminal jurisdiction is in fact a
prerogative of sovereign States, giving them the
power to judge the offences committed within
their conventional borders.
Under this approach, States are authorized to
exercise their jurisdiction, according to permissive
principles such as territoriality, active and passive
personality, protective and, finally, universality
principles. In the case of universal jurisdiction
what has become of the nexus between the case
and the state? According to universal jurisdiction,
there is nothing to connect the criminal factors,
linking to the state’s interests. Universal
jurisdiction is based solely on the nature of the
crime” without regard to where the crime was
committed, the nationality of the alleged or
convicted perpetrator, the nationality of the
victim, or any another connection to the State,
exercising such jurisdiction”1.
What are the historical grounds for this
jurisdiction? What is its logical basis? And,
finally, can and should universal jurisdiction be
exercised? First of all, tracing universal
jurisdiction back to its real origins, the minority
authoritative doctrine, with which I agree, locates
the source of this principle in a few passages of
the Old Testament2. Here, in some books, it is
written that God does not only indict and punish
the Jewish people, the inhabitants of the place
called Israel, but also foreign people and foreign
States, such as Damascus, Gaza, and Edon, once
they have committed delicts offensive to all the
                                                          
1
 The definition is due to the first Princeton principle
on universal jurisdiction, in Bassiouni M. C. et al.,
“The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction”,
in M. C. Bassiouni (edited by) (Eds), Post- conflict
Justice, Transnational Publishers, N.Y., 2002, at 1003.
See recently on topic Orakhelashvli A., “Between
Impunity and Accountability for Serious International
Crimes: Legal and Policy Approaches”, in Netherlands
International Law Review, LV(2008), 207.
2
  See Höffe O., Gibt es ein interkulturelles Strafrecht?
Ein philosophischer Versuch, Suhrkamp Verlaine,
Frankfurt am Main, 1999, pp. 20-21.
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mankind3. Of course, this is a theoretical approach
which is not a legal source that can support
research into universal patterns of criminal law4.
In as much as the minority doctrine lacks any
legal source, we are lead to analyze the majority
doctrine, which traces the origin of universal
jurisdiction back to a passage of the sixth century
Codex Iustiniani5. By regulating the competence
of the different governors of the Roman Empire,
the Code conferred jurisdiction on both the
tribunal of the place where the crime was
committed (forum commissi delicti, the territorial
jurisdiction) and the place where the perpetrator
was arrested (forum deprehensionis). This was
indeed a typical form of universality rooted in the
Roman conception of the Empire6: all crimes that
take place in Roman territory, comprised of
different countries, are subject to Roman criminal
law.  Considering Rome to be a global state, the
Roman tribunals regarded themselves as
competent to judge all criminal matters that
occurred anywhere within the Roman Empire.
During the mediaeval age, according to the
Statutes of the Northern Italian States, which
followed the Roman conception of jurisdiction,
offenders could be prosecuted anywhere they
were found. The general rule was everybody’s
rule. It is clear that the rationale for universal
jurisdiction was not uniformly understood during
this period. Thereafter, in the modern age, Hugo
Grotius theorized universal jurisdiction, applying
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 See Amos, I: 3; 2:8; Isaiah 13-23; Jeremiah, 46-51,
Ezekiel, 25-32; Jonas 1.1.
4
 See for cursory and legal justifications of universal
jurisdiction C. Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in International
Law, Oxford University Press, N.Y. 2008, at 106.
5
 Codex Iustinianus, recensuit Paulus Krueger,
Berolini, Weidmanno, 1877, at 252.
6
 T. Mommsen, Le droit pénal romain,  Albert
Fontemoing éditeur, Paris, 1907, at 121.
it to crimes violating natural law and upsetting the
societas generi humanis7.
The universality principle for the first time laid
the basis for exceeding territorial boundaries. The
classical crime giving rise to universal jurisdiction
without boundaries under customary international
law is piracy8.  Pirates are men without kingdom,
law, or historical past; sometimes considered
stateless, they lived sailing on the high seas
outside the state’s sovereignty. This is the political
justification giving to all States jurisdiction to
punish piracy offenders9. As an act of juridical
transliteration, the transnational dimension of
crimes such as piracy that concern the common
interests of multiple states, is transformed into the
international dimension of a crime affecting the
interests of all States. Transnational crimes are
fundamentally different from international crimes.
A transnational crime, such as terrorism or
counterfeiting, concerns a state’s competence to
exercise jurisdiction where state sovereignty is
absent or is common to multiple states, whereas
international crimes such as genocide affect the
universal values of the global community10. The
universal right to prosecute the crime wherever it
was committed came into being for this reason,
allowing every State to become the venue of an
(in)ternational trial.
                                                          
7
 H. Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis, Libri tres, euravit
B.J.A. De Kanter-Van Hettingatromps, Scientia Verlag
Aalen, 1993, at 509.
8
  C. Schmitt, Il nomos della terra: nel diritto
internazionale dello «jus publicum europaeum»,
Adelphi, Milano, 1991, at 207.
9
  About the historical and philosophical implications
see C. Schmitt, Terra e Mare, Giuffrè editore, Milano,
1986, 50-51. Recently Shy Kraytman Y., “Universal
Jurisdiction-Historical Roots and Modern
Implications”, in Journal of International Studies,
2(2005), at 98-99.
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2. Researching legal frameworks: will universal
jurisdiction advance the unity or the
fragmentation of international criminal law?
The topic of universal jurisdiction is controversial,
but nevertheless not uninteresting, from two
different aspects of international law: first, the
question of the legality of the principle and its
recognition by states, and second, the question of
how universal jurisdiction is exercised. The
principle reason for this controversy is the lack of
sources and positive law defining the limits and
conditions of universal jurisdiction. One
commentator, Antonio Cassese, has asserted that
there is nothing about customary international law
which authorizes states “to assert criminal
jurisdiction over offences perpetrated abroad by
foreigners against foreigners”11. Some theorists
have deemed universal jurisdiction to be a form of
national jurisdiction in the national territory, when
a state with no other nexus to the crime exercises
jurisdiction where a suspect is present. That is to
be distinguished from international criminal
jurisdiction exercised by international courts and
tribunals12.
Universal jurisdiction also applies when a state
fails to exercise territorial jurisdiction, either
because it could not or would not. Each case
implies the presence of international crimes. As
William Schabas has commented, “it is the sheer
scale and horror of the crime concerned, such as
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 See Schabas W., “Regions, Regionalism and
International Criminal Law”, in New Zeeland Yearbook
of International Law, 4(2007), at 3.
11
 See Cassese A., “Is the Bell tolling for Universality’
A Plea for a Sensible Notion of Universal Jurisdiction,
Journal of International Criminal Justice, 1(2003), at
589.
12
 Inazumi M., Universal Jurisdiction in Modern
International Law: Expansion of National Jurisdiction
for prosecuting Serious Crimes under International
Law, Intersentia, Antwerpen-Oxford, 2005, at 48.
genocide and crimes against Humanity that
warrants universality”13. The inability, the
impossibility or the unwillingness of a state
genuinely to prosecute or to investigate an
international offence wherever it is committed or
in the time in which it is realized, is expressed in
an important article of the Rome Statute.
 In accordance with the well known principle of
complementarily, embodied in the Preamble and
in articles 1, 17 of the Rome Statute, the
International Criminal Court (ICC) can be seen as
the secondary means in the prosecution of
perpetrators of international crimes. In the subtle
balance of international justice, domestic tribunals
have priority over the ICC.  As it is known, ICC’s
competence is limited by ratione temporis. The
permanent tribunal may not take jurisdiction over
crimes committed before July 2002. For this
reason, universal jurisdiction continues to be
salient.
Nevertheless the relationship between the two
different typologies of jurisdiction is complex and
overlapping. While the Rome Statute sanctions
and legally defines the categories of most relevant
international crimes14, many states parties have
completely changed their legislation. Some
provide for universal jurisdiction in respect to
international crimes, and have introduced juridical
definitions of these crimes in their criminal codes.
This returns us to the starting point of this study:
has universal jurisdiction the potential to unify or
fragment international criminal law?15
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 Schabas, op.cit., at 4.
14
  As the artt. 6,7,8, ICC
15
 On fragmentation generally see Worster W. T.,
“Competition and Comity in the Fragmentation of
International Law”, in Brooklyn Journal of
International Law, 34(2008), at 119; Hafner G., “Pros
and Cons ensuing from Fragmentation of International
Law”, in Michigan Journal of International Law,
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3. A legal approach to unity: is there a plea for
a uniform enacting of universal jurisdiction?
First of all, on finding a minimum form of unity, I
will examine some states that have included the
principle of universal jurisdiction in their criminal
systems before and after the ICC Statute came
into force. In the following section, I will inquire
which crimes reflect global values justifying the
use of universal jurisdiction.
Without unity of law, there is neither uniformity
in the application of law nor predictability of
judicial decisions. Within a national context, it is
possible to frame the complex system of laws and
jurisdictions; in the international system the unity
is more difficult to achieve. Because there are
many different sources of international law, for
example customary law, international treaties and
conventions, jus cogens, obligatio et omnes,
positive law, it is difficult to achieve a coherent
system of laws. Are there any guidelines for
locating a certain degree of unity in the analysis
and application of universal jurisdiction in this
world of diversity? In this paper, I focus on
identifying a sense of unity in universal
jurisdiction. I furthermore consider the crimes to
which universal jurisdiction can be applied and
the common basis for its application.
In practice, it is not a simple task to incorporate
universal jurisdiction by harmonizing domestic
definitions of crime. States will have to make their
internal laws compatible not only with the Rome
Statute, but also with their domestic penal
                                                                                         
25(2004), pp. 849 ss.; Brownlie I., Problems
concerning the Unity of International Law in
International Law at the Time of its Codification.
Studies in Honour of Robert Ago, Giuffré, Milano,
1987, 153, 162; at least Martineau A. C., “The Rhetoric
of Fragmentation: Fear and Faith in International
Law”, in Leiden Journal of International Law,
(22)2009, at 1.
systems. Different States have taken different
approaches. In relation to the universal nature of
the crime and the claim of universal jurisdiction,
one authority, George Fletcher, has offered the
following schemata: 16a universal approach
focuses on the nature of the crime based on the
character of the wrong, not the national
personality of the victim or perpetrator. On the
other hand a parochial approach is based on the
nationality of the victim or criminal, as with
treason or spying, or on the territorial link.
Fletcher’s theory leads to the conclusion that there
are two forms of jurisdiction: the first is based on
the universality principle, while the second is
based on the territoriality or nationality principle.
On this view, the undisputed requisite for
exercising jurisdiction over crimes concerning the
international community as a whole is a
legislative provision enacted before the
commission of the offence.  This is expressed in
the principle nullum crimem sine lege, the
principle which satisfies at the same time the
supporters of universal jurisdiction and the
skeptics on the topic.  ”Which law to apply?”17
In this context the aim at achieving unity in the
interpretation and application of international
criminal law on a global level implies a universal
code of international crimes, or at least an effort to
hypothesize if there is a form of unity ratione
materia for applying universal jurisdiction.
                                                          
16
 Fletcher G. P., “Parochial versus Universal Criminal
Law”, in Journal of International Crime Justice,
3(2005), at 24.
17
 See on the maximum nullum crimen sine loge
Fletcher, ibidem, at 21; the quotation refers to
Koskenniemi M., “The Fate of Public International
Law: Constitutional Utopia or Fragmentation?”,
Chorley lecture 2006, London School of Economics, 7
June 2006. «This, again, will depend on how a matter
will be described, which of its aspects are seen as
central and which marginal» at 17.
Rivista di Criminologia, Vittimologia e Sicurezza – Vol. V –N. 1 –Gennaio-Aprile 2011 39
This judicial unity would emerge from the crimes
“of concern to the international community as a
whole.” As observed above, universal jurisdiction
focuses on the nature of the crimes. But is there
unity in this field? Starting by general rules a
basic form of unity is required to ascertain the
presence of national or international laws that
reflect universal jurisdiction.18 Moving to specific
rules, one must consider the universal crimes.
Legal scholars have identified a permissive and a
mandatory form of universal jurisdiction.
Permissive universal jurisdiction occurs when a
State has an option to use universal jurisdiction
for a violation of customary international law
without any obligation to enact legislation on the
matter. Mandatory universal jurisdiction occurs
when a State must exercise universal jurisdiction
under its conventional international law by
conforming its criminal system to an international
treaty or convention that it has ratified19. Here I
inquire into the mandatory form of universal
jurisdiction. I explore the laws of those countries
that have enacted universal jurisdiction or
modified it after the Rome Statute came into
force.
3.1 States that have enacted a form of universal
jurisdiction for the core crimes.
Before ratification of the Rome Statute certain
                                                          
18
 For a complete overview of countries that have
enacted universal jurisdiction Reydams L., Universal
Jurisdiction. International and Municipal Legal
Perspectives, Oxford University Press, N.Y., 2003, 86
ss. For a synthetic global survey see Sabaudo S.P.R.,
“Universal Jurisdiction over CPP-NPA Action against
Rejectionists: Barangay San Vincent in Focus, in
Philippine Law Journal, 2006, pp. 500-501, sub 35 ss.
19
 Hale C. K., “Does the Evolution of International
Criminal Law end with the ICC? The ‘roaming ICC’: a
Model International Criminal Court for a State-centric
World of International Law”, in Denver Journal of
International Law and Policy, 35(2007), at 420.
states included in their criminal system an
extraterritorial principle that differed from the
principle of universal jurisdiction in its absolute or
conditional form20.
Article 64 of the Austrian penal code, for
example, addresses extraterritorial jurisdiction,
extending to specific listed offences or ”other
punishable criminal acts which Austria is under an
obligation to punish even when they have been
committed abroad” including those crimes
prohibited by the UN Convention Against Torture
and the Geneva Conventions21. The provision of
genocide is present in the penal criminal code ex
art. 321, but not war crimes although Austria is a
party to the Geneva Conventions.
Similarly, Danish law permits the criminal
prosecution of international crimes committed
abroad. This jurisdiction is established for the
offences included in the Geneva Conventions and
the Additional protocols I, II. Article 8.6 of the
Danish penal code establishes jurisdiction over
genocide, crimes against humanity and violations
of the Hague Conventions.  But Danish law is
subordinate when another State has requested the
extradition of the author of the crimes, or when
the extradition has been refused and the alleged
offences are sanctioned by Danish law. In the
Danish criminal code it is possible to prosecute
common crimes such as injury to the person,
outside the territorial limits of Denmark, with a
maximum sentence of eight years imprisonment.
According to Article 7 of the Italian criminal
code, Italian judges may prosecute foreigners or
                                                          
20
 Reydams L., Universal Jurisdiction. International
and Municipal Legal Perspectives, Oxford University
Press, N.Y., 2003, 86 ss. The States are Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany,
Netherlands, Israel, Senegal, Spain, Switzerland,
United Kingdom, and United States.
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Italian nationals for offences committed abroad in
relation to specific laws and international
conventions, like the Geneva Conventions, the
UN Convention against Torture, or the
Convention on the prevention and punishment of
the crime of Genocide. This can be seen as an
exercise of the universality principle. There is,
however, no specific provision regarding
universal jurisdiction22.
Article 689 of the French code of criminal
procedure provides for universal jurisdiction
before French courts for offences such as torture
and terrorism,” committed outside the territory of
the Republic,” when French law is applicable
under the provisions of Book I of the criminal
code or of any statute, or of an international
convention, against the accused person regardless
of their nationality if they are present in France.
This does not constitute a pure form of universal
jurisdiction, but is rather only a conditional form.
The French law for extraterritorial jurisdiction
does not apply to the Geneva Conventions,
although France is a party23.
In Israeli Law on the prevention and punishment
of genocide24, article 5 provides that “a person
who has committed outside Israel an act which is
an offence under this Law may be prosecuted and
                                                                                         
21
  See art. 64.6 Austrian penal code.
22
 See Roscini M., “Great Expectations. The
Implementation of the Rome Statute in Italy”, in
Journal of International Crime Justice, 5(2007), pp.
493-511. On 19th June 2002 a draft law has been
presented in Italy for the implementing of universal
jurisdiction for the international crimes (the criminal
acts  listed in the ratified international conventions  are
the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity and
war crimes, as well as described in the ICC Statute). The
draft law did not come into force.
23
 Sulzer J., “Implementing the Principle of Universal
Jurisdiction in France”, in W. Kaleck et al. (eds.),
International Prosecution of Human Rights Crimes,
Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2007, pp. 125 ss.
24
  The law n. 5710-1950.
punished in Israel as if he had committed the act
in Israel”25.
In Switzerland, article 6 bis of its criminal code
provides for the principle of universal jurisdiction
for crimes committed abroad that violate
international treaties, domestic law, when the
perpetrator is in the territory and when there has
been no request for extradition or when it has
been denied. The Military penal code contains
articles 108, 109 that penalize offenses committed
in non-international as well as international armed
conflicts, referring to international humanitarian
law.
Although the United States has not enacted
universal jurisdiction, the Restatement Third of
the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
(1987) includes two provisions on universal
jurisdiction: the first § 404 Universal jurisdiction
to define and punish certain offences, recognized
by the community of nations as of universal
concern, (such as piracy, slave trade, attacks on or
hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and
some acts of terrorism); the second § 423
Jurisdiction to adjudicate in enforcement of
universal and other non-territorial crimes, a form
of universal jurisdiction, established as a matter of
treaty obligations thought the inclusion of the
principle aut dedere aut judicare in the treaties
                                                          
25
 See Bass G. J., “The Adolf Eichmann Case:
Universal and National Jurisdiction”, in S. Macedo
(edited by), Universal Jurisdiction: National Courts
and the Prosecution of Serious Crimes under
International Law, University of Pennsylvania Press,
Philadelphia, 2003. «Israel law in 1961 included a
number of principles of universal jurisdiction. Some of
these extraterritorial principles were not Zionist at all,
inherited from legislation under the old British
mandate: a standard 1936 provision for prosecuting
international pirates as hostis humni generis and a 1936
law against dangerous drugs that evidently did not limit
itself to the borders of Britain’ Palestine mandate» at
85.
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addressing international crimes. Furthermore,
there is a statute that authorizes the exercise of
universal jurisdiction, over torture committed
abroad26. In October 2008 the United States
recognized the universal jurisdiction over child
soldier cases, by enacting a statute empowering
the American courts to prosecute anyone from any
state for their role in the recruitment of child
soldiers anywhere in the world27.
3.2 States that have re-drafted a form of universal
jurisdiction for the core crimes.
The number of states that have enacted universal
jurisdiction has increased after the Rome Statute
came into force, with different consequences. The
implementation by the states parties of the Rome
Statute has, in fact, accelerated the evolution of
universal jurisdiction. Even if States parties are
not compelled by ICC Statute to adopt UJ for the
crimes, several countries have chosen to enact or
to amend universal jurisdiction in their domestic
systems in order to prosecute the authors of
crimes under the Rome Statute on the basis of
universal jurisdiction28.
The principle of universal jurisdiction under
Belgian law, as established by an enactment in
1993, is expressed in very broad terms.  There is
no requirement for any nexus between Belgium
and the commission of crime, and it covers war
crimes committed during the course of
international armed conflicts as well as internal
conflicts, and, as well, crimes against humanity.
This has been characterized as absolute universal
                                                          
26
 The Torture Convention. See 18 U.S.C. § 234a
(1984).
27
 See S. 2135 Child Soldiers Accountability Act of 3
October 2008.
28
 The articles 6, 7, 8 Rome Statute.
jurisdiction29. When the ICC was established, the
Belgian Parliament passed the 2003 Act,
reaffirming the principle of universal jurisdiction
and expanding it to cover the crimes within the
jurisdiction of the ad hoc Tribunals, the ICC and
other municipal jurisdictions. In relation to ICC’s
jurisdiction the Belgian Parliament has reversed
the rule of complementary; for acts falling under
the jurisdiction of the ICC, when the ICC
prosecutor commences an investigation, the
Belgian Court of Cassation is obliged to declare
that its courts lack jurisdiction30.
Germany has also adopted a pure form of
universal jurisdiction. The German code, has
established the principle of universality for all
criminal offences against international law present
in the code of international crimes even if the
crime was committed abroad and bears no
relationship to Germany.31 In particular, to avoid
impunity for serious human rights violations, the
German code relies, first of all, on the territorial
states; second, on the ICC and, if applicable, other
on international tribunals; and finally, on the
states acting in accordance with universal
jurisdiction32.
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 Reydams L., “Prosecuting Crimes under
International Law on the Basis of Universal
Jurisdiction: the Experience of Belgium”, in H.
Fischer, C. Kreiβ, S. Rolf Lüder (eds.), International
and National Prosecution of Crimes under
International Law. Current Developments, BWV,
Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, II, 2006, p. 799.
30
 Vandermeersch D., “The ICC Statute and the
Belgian Law”, in Journal of International Crime
Justice, 2(2004), pp. 133-144.
31
 See Section I CCML.
32
 So we have a pure form of UJ for the object, the
serious violations of human rights; but a «conditional
subsidiarity of the universal jurisdiction principle»,
subordinated by a prosecutor’s discretion ex §153f
CPC. See Ambos K., “International Core Crimes,
Universal Jurisdiction and §153f of the German
Criminal Procedure Code: A Commentary on the
Decisions of the Federal Prosecutor General and the
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The Netherlands has also embraced universal
jurisdiction. When the Dutch Government ratified
the ICC Statute, it took into account the decision
of the International Court of Justice in Congo v.
Belgium33. Accordingly, with respect to the ICJ
issues34, the Dutch legal order has opted for a
regime of conditional universal jurisdiction.  The
Dutch Ratification Act, in consideration of the
relevant provisions of the penal code and the code
of military law, requires either the presence of the
suspect in the Netherlands, or that the crime has
been committed against a Dutch national.
Moreover, for universal jurisdiction a nexus must
be shown between the crime and the prosecuting
State.  The presence of the suspect in the domestic
territory constitutes such a nexus. This provision
follows the guidance of the dissenting opinion in
the Yerodia case, to wit, there is no authority in
international criminal law for states to establish
universal jurisdiction in absentia35.
Under Spanish criminal law, Article 23.4 of the
                                                                                         
Stuttgart Higher Regional Courts in the Abu
Ghraib/Rumsfeld Case”, in Criminal Law Forum, 18,
2007, at 43.
33
 See Case concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April
2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium),
Judgment, ICJ, 14 February 2002, Website:
www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/Icobe/icobejudgement/icobejud
gement_20020214_giullaume.pdf.
See for a discussion Bottini G., “Universal Jurisdiction
after the Creation of International Criminal Court”, in
International Law and Politics, 36(2004), p. 503;
Cassese A., “When May Senior State Officials be Tried
for International Crimes? Some Comments on the
Congo v. Belgium Case”, in European Journal of
International Law, 13/4, 2002, at 853; Wirth S.,
“Immunity for Core Crimes? The ICJ's Judgment in the
Congo v. Belgium Case”, in European Journal of
International Law, 13/4(2002), at 877; O’Keefe R.,
“Universal Jurisdiction-Clarifying the Basic Concept”,
Journal of International Crime Justice, 2(2004), at
734.
34
  See the dissenting opinions in Yerodia case.
35
 See Sluiter G., “Implementation of the ICC Statute in
the Duch Legal Order”, in Journal of International
Crime Justice, 2(2004), at 159.
Ley Organica de poter judicial, the state has
jurisdiction to proceed in respect to crimes and
offences committed in (1) domestic territory; (2)
on board of Spanish sailing vessels or aircraft,
without affecting laws in international treaties to
which Spain is party; (3) committed abroad by
Spanish nationals, or foreigners whose Spanish
nationality was granted before the crime was
perpetrated. Under the Spanish regime, many
crimes are included.   The law covers typical
subjects of universal jurisdiction such as
genocide, terrorism, piracy, but it also includes
crimes related to female genital mutilation and
many other offenses36.
In the famous Scilingo case, the Spanish
Audiencia National made clear the principle of
universality, asserting that conditional universal
jurisdiction is based on the presence of the
accused in Spain and on the Spanish victims of
Scilingo’s wholesale criminality.
The laws of the United Kingdom provide that the
state may apply vicarious jurisdiction for various
international crimes linked to international treaties
of which the state is a party, e.g. for torture and
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and
additional Protocol I. Because it is based on treaty
obligations, the system reflects the flaws and
weaknesses of the treaties themselves37.
There is no provision in the law of England and
Wales for universal jurisdiction, However, section
68 (1-2) International Criminal Court Act 2001
sets forth that proceedings may be brought against
an individual who commits a crime under the
                                                          
36
 See above on the difference between the crimes
admitted.
37
 Discussion group summary Universal jurisdiction for
international crimes. A Summary of the Chatham
House international group meeting held on 9 October
2008.
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Rome Statute outside of the United Kingdom and
subsequently becomes a resident of the United
Kingdom38.
The Australian International Criminal Court Act
2002 reflects the complementary regime of the
Rome Statute with respect to the covered crimes -
offences of genocide, crimes against humanity
and war crimes. By implementing the Rome
Statute, Section 15.4 of the Criminal Code Act
provides for universal jurisdiction over ICC
crimes committed in non-international armed
conflict whether or not Australia has any
independent treaty obligation with regard to those
crimes39. Under this Act the mere presence of a
foreigner in the national territory is a sufficient
basis for jurisdiction over crimes committed
abroad; residence is not required. The statute does
not distinguish between universal jurisdiction in
absentia or conditional universal jurisdiction that
requires the presence of the perpetrator in the
state.
 In Senegal40, the Code de Procedure pénale
authorizes Senegalese courts to exercise universal
jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against
humanity and war crimes, not only when a suspect
is located in Senegal, but also when Senegal has
obtained jurisdiction by extradition41. Under the
                                                          
38
 See R Cryer R., Bekou O., “International Crimes and
ICC Cooperation in England and Wales”, in Journal of
International Crime Justice, 5(2007), at 440.
39
 See Boas G., “An Overview of Implementation by
Australia of the Statute of International Criminal
Court”, in Journal of International Crime Justice,
2(2004), at 179.
40
 See  article 2 l.n°2007/5 February 2007
41
  Senegal. Commentary on implementing legislation
for the Rome Statute, AI Index AFR 49/002/2007. This
is an important breakthrough in view of the decision of
Senegalese Supreme Court, which dismissed the case
against Hissène Habré in 2001, declaring the lack of
jurisdiction over foreign nationals for extraterritorial
crimes. See Cour de Cassation du Sénégal, première
chambre statuant en matière pénale, on 20 March 2001,
amended Code provision, it is to expand the list of
crimes the courts may exercise universal
jurisdiction over its penal code42.
In contrast to other countries, which have
extended the jurisdictional powers of the criminal
law outside the national borders, many states, like
Argentina, have consistently maintained that
criminal law is to be applied exclusively to acts
committed within their territory. In such states,
the jurisdiction of the domestic courts is regulated
by the principle of territoriality, with few
exceptions43.
3.3. The outstanding answer of unity.
As demonstrated by this selective survey, the
forms and conditions for the exercise of universal
jurisdiction are various, and this, of course is a
source of fragmentation in the criminal law. Some
countries, in fact, have adopted an extraterritorial
application of domestic criminal law, also known
as vicarious administration of justice.  They
extend their jurisdiction to international and
national offences, by means of active/passive
personality and protective jurisdictional
principles.
In some cases the state exercises its jurisdiction
over its nationals, even when they are found
                                                                                         
Arrêt n.14, Guengueng et Autres, avaible in:
http//hrw.org/french/themes/habre-cour_de_cass.htlm.
42
 See, about the case Hissène Habré and the return to
Senegal jurisdiction after the implementation of
legislation giving it jurisdiction over grave violations
of international law, such as genocide, war crimes,
crimes against humanity and torture, Moghadam T.,
“Revitalizing Universal Jurisdiction: Lesson from
Hybrid Tribunals applied to the Case of Hissène
Habré”, in Columbia Human Rights Law Review,
39(2008), at 505-6.
43
 See Gaeta P., “Il diritto internazionale e la
competenza giurisdizionale degli Stati per i crimini
internazionali”, in A. Cassese, M. Chiavario, G. De
Francesco (a cura di), Problemi attuali della giustizia
penale internazionale, Giappichelli, Torino, 2005, pag.
497.
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outside the territory, or over a perpetrator found
inside the national boundaries, or over one who
becomes a national after committing a crime.  The
status of the victim can also trigger jurisdiction.
For example, if the victims are present in the
country some states, such as Austria, Italy and
Denmark exercise jurisdiction over crimes
committed outside their territory. Only a few
states, including Belgium, Spain and Germany,
have introduced the principle of universal
jurisdiction as positive law for certain
international offences. The divergence in
substance and appearance among these legislative
provisions is remarkable. On first consideration
one might conclude that codification of universal
jurisdiction would advance uniformity in the
interpretation and implementation of the law.
However, on further examination it has become
clear that codification has only led to a greater
fragmentation of the principle.
Fragmentation affects the principle of universal
jurisdiction because there is no single substantive
norm, but only a complex interaction of juridical
and practical objects and subjects reflecting the
existence of multifarious sources of international
criminal law, made up of hundreds of
international treaties as well as customary rules.
As with every legal innovation, the development
of universal jurisdiction is a dynamic process with
latent contradictions and idealistic aspirations.
Our research about unity in universal jurisdiction
exposes the challenges of seeking uniformity in
norms that are in transition.
The Eichmann case provides a useful example of
the central problem in universal jurisdiction.
Eichmann argued that the Israeli court could not
exercise universal jurisdiction over him because
there was no support for it in international law.
Specifically, Article VI 1948 Genocide
Conventions provides that” [a] person charged
with genocide shall be tried by a competent
tribunal of the State in the territory of which the
act was committed or by such international penal
tribunals” formed by the contracting Parties that
have accepted its jurisdiction. The Jerusalem
district court declared that ”the principles
underlying the Convention are principles which
are recognized by civilized nations as binding on
all States, even without any conventional
obligations.”44 What then is the principle that
legitimates the jurisdiction of the Israeli court
over Eichmann? Hannah Arendt, in The Banality
of Evil, addresses this question45. Israel could
argue that Eichmann was indicted during the first
trial in Nuremberg, but after the arrest warrant
escaped to Argentina.  On taking Eichmann
prisoner, Israel captured a hostis humanis generis,
finding him guilty of crimes against humanity.
Genocide is, in fact, an offence against humanity
as whole, and in this case, the Jewish people
represent “humanity.” This argument is at once a
moral standard and a declaration of positive law.
The State of Israel’s “right to punish” derives
from” a universal source (pertaining to the whole
of mankind) which vests the right to prosecute and
punish the crimes of this order in every State
within the family of nations”46.
The concept of universal jurisdiction, and the
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 Reservation to the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Advisory
opinion) 1951, ICJ Report, 16.
45
 See Arendt H., Eichmann in Jerusalem: a Report on
the Banality of Evil, Penguin Books, N.Y., 1963, at p.
261.
46
 Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36
Int’L.Rep.18, 50 (Ist.Dist.Ct.-Jerusalem 1961, aff.’d 36
Int’L Reo.277 (Ist.Sup.Ct. 1962).
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underlying crimes, represents an ethical right that
has been transformed into a legal right with
juridical status, protected by international criminal
law. The principle of universal jurisdiction must
yet be defined in the positive law, even if many
projects on uniform drafting are in progress.  Here
we search for unity. We will attempt to outline
some possible concepts of unity.
 4. The possible concepts of universal offences
in the modern legislations and in the state of
jurisprudence. Is there unity in the application
of universal jurisdiction within international
criminal law?
4.1. A certain distinction: transnational crimes
versus international/universal crimes.
We will now analyze whether universal
jurisdiction is properly applied to specific crimes,
namely to the core crimes in the different
countries that are party to the ICC Statute.
Secondly, this inquiry about unity considers the
definition of crimes both under universal
jurisdiction as adopted by the states, and under the
ICC Statute. What is here the affect of jus cogens?
Do states, in their implementing legislation, or
national courts in their jurisprudence, use the
same definitions of crimes as the ICC, or are they
tailored to domestic circumstances and therefore
diverse?
The Appeals Chambers of the ICTY, in the case
of Prosecutor v. Tadic, has opined that “universal
jurisdiction (is) nowadays acknowledged in the
case of international crimes”47. Following the
authority of Tadic, the Trial Chamber, in
Prosecutor v. Furundzija, ruled that every State
has the right to prosecute and punish the authors
of crimes that are universally condemned
wherever they occur48.
These cases make clear that a state can apply
universal jurisdiction to international crimes... But
what are the so-called international crimes? Or
even more challenging, what is the primary,
essential typology of an international crime?
In general international law, universal jurisdiction
is provided for in a number of multilateral treaties,
as the 1973 Convention on the suppression and
punishment of the crime of Apartheid49, the 1984
Convention against torture and other cruel,
inhuman treatment or punishment50, the 1988
Montréal Convention on hijacking51, the 1988
Convention on the suppression of unlawful acts
against the safety of maritime navigations52, the
1973 Conventions on the prevention and
punishment of crimes against internationally
protected persons, including diplomatic agents53,
the 1979 Convention against the taking of
hostages54, the 1994 Convention on the Safety of
the United Nations and associated personnel55, the
1971 Convention on psychotropic substances56,
the 1961 Single Convention on narcotic drugs and
more others57.
In sum, treaty law makes clear that universal
jurisdiction is applicable to numerous crimes.
However, is genocide similar to drug trafficking?
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 Prosecutor v. Tadic, IT-94-I, para. 62.
48
 Prosecutor v. Furundzija, IT-95-17-1, para.156, with
referring to Eichmann Case and Demjanijuk Case. «It
is the universal character of the crimes in questions
which vests in every State the authority to try and
punish those who participated in their commission».
49
 See articles 4,5.
50
 See article 5.2
51
 See article 3 in relation to article 5.2.
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 See article 3.
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 See article 3.
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 See article 5.
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 See article 10.
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 See article 22.5.
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Is extermination of civilian populations with
intent to destroy them similar to counterfeit ring?
Are Mafia organized associations like torture or
the inhuman treatment of persons? The
application in accordance with treaty does not
seem to turn on the severity of the crime.  The list
of crimes is not explicable in relation to the object
(whether more or less serious or dangerous), but
rather to two different aspects of the nature of the
crime. These two aspects are first of all, the
manner in which the crime unfolds across borders,
and second, the universal condemnation of certain
grave offenses. In the first category, transnational
crime turns on the operational capacity of criminal
organisations across the borders of many
countries: the crime is reflected in multiple states.
Also known as cross-border crimes, these criminal
acts are distinguished by their multiterritorial
dimension, as, for example, the traditional
markets of organised crime - drugs, arms and
lately the trafficking in human beings. (These
people may be refugees from war-torn regions,
immigrants seeking employment, which they
cannot find in their own country, or women and
children trapped in the web of prostitution).
While not my subject here, the definition of
transnational crime remains unclear, and this too,
contributes to fragmentation58. More often it is
described stereotypically as “organized crimes”
which cross national borders, while international
crimes are those prescribed by international law
and custom. On the other hand, these transnational
offenses are sometimes defined as acts prohibited
                                                                                         
57
 See article 36.4.
58
 See Passas N., “Globalization, Criminogenetic
Asymmetries and Economic Crime”, in European
Journal of Law Reform, 1(1999), 399, at 400-01, with
referring to Bassiouni, “The penal Characteristic of
by the penal law of more than one country. Recent
developments, however, have completely altered
these understandings of transnational offenses.
Individuals can now bring actions against state
actors and can be prosecuted for breaches of
international criminal laws. In this new context,
the distinction between transnational and
international crimes is difficult to ascertain and
not particularly helpful. The two expressions are
often used interchangeably, although they apply in
different situations, and, as well, have some points
in common.
Moreover transnational crimes like international
crimes are not clearly set forth in domestic legal
regimes. This leaves open the possibility of
adopting non –legal criteria for such crimes. As
one commentator notes, “[t]transnational crime is
cross-border misconduct, which entails avoidable
and unnecessary harm to society, which is serious
enough to warrant State intervention and similar
to other kinds of acts criminalized in the countries
concerned or by international law.”
As for the term “international crime,” we refer
here to offences which damage the global values
of the international community. This is the
fundamental underpinning of international crime.
Indeed, within the meaning of the universal
approach, a formal legal definition of crime is an
act violating the human right of another,
regardless of where the delict has been committed.
The search for unity of universal jurisdiction is
restricted and limited to a specific field, to wit, the
violation of human rights, safeguarded by norms
that reflect universal values.
                                                                                         
Conventional International Law”, in Case Western
Reserve Journal of International Law, 15(1983), 27.
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4.2 Global crimes that could be subject to
universal jurisdiction (a selected list).
The two criteria I propose here to determine if a
specific crime should be subject to universal
jurisdiction are whether (1) the act is contained in
the Rome Statute; and (2) the act violates
universally accepted values.
I will consider here the specific offences of
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity. These are crimes that offend humanity
as a whole; hence the nature of the crime is the
basic criterion to apply universal jurisdiction. Two
exegetic directions can be discerned: the legal
provisions in the text of the Rome Statute, as
interpreted by case law, as long as they respect the
central rule nullum crimen sine lege; or, more
subtly, the basic ideological principles, which is
the philosophic rationale underlying universal
jurisdiction. One orientation does not preclude the
other; rather the two are mutually reinforcing.
Prior to the Rome Statute, lacking an authoritative
definition of crimes against humanity spoke to the
fragmentation of universal jurisdiction. These
crimes were found in Charter of the International
Military Tribunal (IMT) of Nuremberg59. The
IMT, for the first time, juridical codified crimes
against humanity in two distinct categories: 1)
murder, extermination, enslavement, and
deportation of civilian populations, whatever their
nationality; 2) persecution for political, racial, or
religious grounds. As Cassese sums it up “[t]hese
atrocities are so abhorrent that they shock our
sense of human dignity.”60 As legal meanings for
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 See article 6(c).
60
  See Cassese A., “Crimes against Humanity”, in A.
Cassese, P. Gaeta, J.H.W.D. Jones (eds.), The Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court: a
Commentary, vol. I, 2002, pp. 353 et ss. «After 1945
the link between crimes against humanity and war
these crimes have evolved in positive law and
jurisprudence, it is clear that such offences must
be large-scale or systematic, and there must be a
nexus to state action.  Where states are not fully
responsible for the crimes, it must be established
that they have tolerated them.
 Article 5 of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Statute departs
from customary international law. It revives the
nexus between the crimes and national or
international conflicts, but abandons the
requirement of widespread or systematic practice.
In the Erdemovic case, crimes against humanity
are defined as “serious acts of violence which
harm human beings by striking what is most
essential to them: their life, liberty, physical
welfare, health, and or dignity. Crimes against
humanity also transcend the individual because
when the individual is assaulted, humanity comes
under attack and is negated. It is therefore the
concept of humanity as victim which essentially
characterizes crimes against humanity.”61 Here,
the jurisprudence reflects an idealistic concept of
humanity and considers it to be an objective
element of the crime.  Art. 3 of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) Statute
reflects another formulation, requiring as an
element of the crime systematic attack against
civilian populations for political, racial, ethnic,
and/or religious reasons. Both the ICTY and the
                                                                                         
(armed conflict) gradually disappeared» for the effect
of «article II(I) (c) of such ‘multinational’ legislation as
Control Council Law n.10, passed by the four
victorious Powers four months after the London
Agreement by national legislations (Canadian and
French penal codes), case law as well as international
treaties. This evolution gradually led to the
abandonment of nexus between crimes against
humanity and war». 356, passim.
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ICTR statutes include three categories of offences
that were absent from the Nuremburg Charter:
torture, imprisonment, and rape.
The ICC statute differs from the other three.
Article 7 ICC Statute requires a specific mens rea:
the offenses must be committed” with the
knowledge of the attack,” which makes it more
difficult to prove the crime. In the absence of an
international convention on crimes against
humanity, these offences can nevertheless be
considered jus cogens in accordance with the
Vienna Convention (ex art. 53 of Vienna
Convention of the law of treaties)62.
Under the theory of crimes against humanity, one
can prosecute a broad range of human rights
abuses where there is a discriminatory attack on
civilian populations.  Such a crime is not
generally a criminal act under domestic laws, for
these laws do not require that the crime be part of
a “discriminatory attack on a civilian population.”
For example, no such crime can be found in the
Italian penal code. Most delicts included in Article
7 of the Rome Statute are covered by national
provisions: for example, murder by art. 575 Italian
penal code; rape and other forms of sexual
violence by articles 609 bis et seq., the crime of
enslavement ex the art. 600. However, the concept
of widespread and systematic attack is absent
from the domestic laws.
When in 1999 Belgium incorporated the ICC
Statute into its domestic laws, it defined crimes
against humanity (genocide) in line with the
Rome Statute, making Belgium the first state to
make its laws consistent with the Statute63.
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 Prosecutor v. Eredemovic, Sentencing Judgement,
Case.no-IT-96-22-T§ 28, Trial Chambers I, 29
November 1996.
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 See Bassiouni, above, p. 973.
63
 See the effect of 2003 amendment.
Neither the Nuremberg Military tribunal, nor the
Tokyo Military tribunal, makes reference to the
crime of genocide. Article 2 of the Convention on
the prevention and punishment of genocide,
adopted in 1948, and first codified the crime as
follows:
genocide means any of the following acts
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group,
as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b)
Causing serious bodily or mental harm to
members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting
on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births
within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring
children of the group to another group.
The United Nations had occasion to address
genocide in connection with the wars in the
Balkans. In its resolution 47/121 of 18 December
1992, concerning the situation on Bosnia and
Herzegovina in 1992, the General Assembly
affirmed the ”abhorrent policy of ‘ethnic
cleansing’ as a form of genocide.”. In the ICTY
case of Prosecutor v. Kristic of 1 August 2001
the” intent to destroy” element diverges from the
interpretation of the General Assembly resolution.
The Court found there that “ethnic cleansing” or
the intent to remove a group from a particular area
did not constitute “intent to destroy” and therefore
was not genocide. The Court reasoned that”
customary international law limits the definition
of genocide to those acts seeking the physical or
biological destruction of all or part of the
group”64. The attack against the cultural and
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 See Prosecutor v. Kristic, IT-98-33-T, 1 August
2001, Trial Chambers, para. 577-580; Prosecutor v.
Krupreskic, IT-95-16-T, 14 January 2000, para. 517.
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sociological features of a human group “would
not fall under the definition of genocide,” the
Court held, reasoning that “where there is a
physical or biological destruction there are often
simultaneous attacks on the cultural and religious
property and symbols of the targeted group as
well.” Similar is the ICJ judgement of 26
February 2007, in the case of Bosnia and
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro65. The
Court reasoned as follows:
Neither the intent, as a matter of policy, to render
an area ’ethnically homogeneous’, nor the
operation that may be carried out to implement
such policy, can as such be designated as
genocide: the intent that characterised genocide is
’destroy, in whole or in part’ a particular group.
Article 6 of the Genocide Convention does not
establish universal jurisdiction but neither does it
exclude it as a principle of customary
international law. In Spain at the time Scilingo
was decided, there was no authority to prosecute
crimes against humanity as a domestic crime. In
Scilingo the Spanish court resorts to genocide as a
catchall for these criminal acts, even though the
conduct did not constitute the separate legal
category of “crimes against humanity” at the time
when they were committed.  In this respect, the
decision violates the legality principle, relying
upon the principle of universal jurisdiction as a
default jurisdiction whenever the territorial or
national state fails to act. How should the decision
of the Audiencia Nationale be explained? A broad
interpretation of genocide served to compensate
for the absence of the more appropriate category
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 See Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and
Montenegro, (Case concerning the application of the
Convention on the prevention and punishment of the
crime of Genocide), unreported, ICJ, 26 February
2007.
of ‘crimes against humanity’ in Scilingo66
Because the Genocide convention had no fixed
content, the judges deployed it to locate a flexible
and dynamic solution, but in doing so, the Court
violated the principle of legality67.
The Geneva Conventions and the Convention
against Torture place a legally binding obligation
on the ratifying States to exercise jurisdiction over
persons accused of grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions and of the Convention against
Torture or to extradite them to a country that will
accept the accused. The term “war crimes” is not
present in the Geneva Conventions; the
Conventions cover “grave breaches,” as serious
violations of international humanitarian law
during international or non international armed
conflict, by including both offences defined under
customary law (ex common article 3) of Geneva
Conventions and the offences set forth in Article
85.5 I Protocol - the real war crimes. The first
category of war crimes - represented by serious
violations of common article 3 Geneva
Conventions, and other serious violations of laws
and customs applicable in armed conflicts of not
international character - led the Dutch Supreme
Court to consider the armed conflict in
Afghanistan as non-international and to exercise
universal jurisdiction ratione materia68. The Court
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 See Van der Wilt H., “Equal Standards? On the
Dialects between National jurisdictions and the
International Criminal Court”, in International
Criminal Law Review, 8(2008), at 236.
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 On the flaws of Gratiela P de L and others v.
Scilingo, Spanish High Court, 19 aprile 2005, see
Tomuschat C., “Issues of Universal Jurisdiction in
Scilingo Case”, in Journal of International Crime
Justice, 3(2005), 1074; Pinzauti G., “An Instance of
Reasonable Universality”, in International Criminal
Law Review, 8(2008), p. 1092.
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 See Dutch war crimes and torture case concerning
Afghanistan, Hague District Court, 14 October 2005;
H.v. Public prosecutor, 29 January 2007, ILDC, 636.
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underscored the obligation to take measures to
protect against other violations set forth in
paragraph 3 common to articles 49/50/129/146,
establishing universal jurisdiction for these
crimes69.
As this survey of international crimes that apply
universal jurisdiction establishes, there is
apparently no uniformity, whether one considers
the positive (evolutive/involutive) definitions of
the most widely recognized crimes, or whether
one applies interpretations and concepts found in
the selected cases on universal jurisdiction.  This
appears to reflect more than fragmentation in the
application of universal jurisdiction.
One must also acknowledge trends towards unity.
Positive law on universal jurisdiction - its terms
and conditions - exists in some States, whose
number is increasing day by day. The legal
definition of international crimes found in the
Rome Statute provides a foundation for applying
universal jurisdiction. The expanding
jurisprudence on the subject will also have
unifying consequences. This unity is not petrified,
but rather subject to change, the demands of
harmonization, and will be adapted to various
juridical and political contexts70.
4.3. An acceptable legal solution.
The multiplicities of offences in international
conventions that can trigger universal jurisdiction
                                                                                         
Contra, for the applicability of u.j. to war crimes in an
internal conflict, Case of prosecutor v. Darko L., Dutch
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 See Mettraux G., “Dutch Courts’ Universal
Jurisdiction over Violations of Common Article 3 qua
War Crimes”, in Journal of International Crime
Justice, 5(2006), at 366; Zegveld L., “Dutch Case on
Torture committed in Afghanistan. The Relevance of
the Distinction between Internal and International
Armed Conflict”, in Journal of International Crime
Justice, 5(2006), 876.
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 Van der Wilt, above, pp. 270-71.
reflect an evolving vision of human rights, one
often not shared universally71.
The Rome Statute can provide a partial solution.
The Statute for the first time provides unequivocal
definitions of the terms genocide, crimes against
Humanity and war crimes – terms that therefore
did not exist in domestic regimes, or existed in
various and often contradictory forms. Since
Rome, these offences “take on a life of their own
as an authoritative and largely customary
statement of international humanitarian and
criminal law, and may thus become a model for
national laws to be enforced under the principle of
universal jurisdiction.”72 Many states, for
example, even after becoming parties of the Rome
Statute, have not included in their domestic
regimes the juridical definitions of international
crimes in the Statute. Other states have adopted
formulations that in some cases completely
conform with, or in others, significantly differ
from the Statute73.
The states fall into these categories:
1. The States that have defined the ICC crimes in
their criminal codes or laws in terms identical to
the ICC Statute, e.g., the United Kingdom,
Australia, South Africa. The advantage here is
that there is at least unity of positive definitions of
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity
as between the Statute and the domestic regime.
But of course, although the text is the same,
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  See Shabas, above, at 22, about some amplification
of the use of universality on referring to international
crimes.
72
 Meron T., “Crimes under the Jurisdiction of the
International Criminal Court”, in H.A.M. von Hebel,
J.G. Lammers & J. Schukking (eds.), Reflections on the
International Criminal Court, 1999, at 47-8, 181, at
185-6.
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 See J.B.TERRACINO, National Implementation of
ICC Crimes. Impact on National Jurisdictions and the
ICC, in 5 (2007) JICJ, 412.
Rivista di Criminologia, Vittimologia e Sicurezza – Vol. V –N. 1 –Gennaio-Aprile 2011 51
jurisprudence and practice could over time result
in broader or more restrictive interpretations of
the ICC crimes by domestic courts.
2. The States that use broader terms than the ICC
definitions, e.g. Bosnia Herzegovina, and the
Netherlands. In the new criminal code of the
independent state deriving from the Former
Yugoslavia, for example, contains a broader
interpretation of war crime.  The unlawful
issuance of money and the forced conversion of
persons to another nationality or religion are
deemed to be a war crime. The Netherlands
sanctions them as international criminal violations
of the customary laws of war, which exceeds the
definition of war crimes in the Rome Statute. This
broader transliteration of ICC crimes in domestic
regimes, such as the Netherlands, can mean that
some acts not criminalized by the Statute are
deemed to be criminal by the domestic regime.
This exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction can
impose risks of two sorts: it may violate the
legality principle and present high sovereignty
costs.
3. The States that have adopted restricted
definitions of ICC crimes, e.g. France and
Equator74. The French State defines crimes against
humanity under the art. 212-1 of its criminal code,
which omits rape, sexual crimes, imprisonment,
and severe deprivation of physical liberty.
Similarly with genocide, French law employs a
more restrictive definition.  Hence the risk of
fragmentation is represented by two related
factors: (1) international crimes left out of
domestic legislation will neither not be prosecuted
at the domestic level; and (2) nor will they be
prosecuted because it is not part of international
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recognized definition of Rome Statute; the
possibility to prosecute the wide apart crime as an
ordinary crime, due to the forecast present in the
national laws.
4. The States that have not adopted implementing
legislation for the ICC, e.g., Italy.  This presents
the real risk that it will be impossible to prosecute
a crime in the total absence of legal provisions.
In conclusion, this research into the basic unity of
universal jurisdiction has identified many juridical
systems that reflect different legal standards on
the elements of offences and the general rules for
implementing universal jurisdiction as a national
law with international effects. Unity and
diversification of law join together in an iterative
process.
4.4. A potential risk of fragmentation in the
application of universal jurisdiction: the vicarious
administration of justice.
After all dissertations about the inclined unity in
the study of universal jurisdiction, it is only right
to devote some thoughts on vicarious or
representational jurisdiction. As we have
observed, some legislations and some court
decisions show deviant options and diversified
keynotes about definitions regarding the core
crimes. The same thing could say in the
disquisition on the concept of universal
jurisdiction as vicarious administration of justice.
Pursuant to this ground of jurisdiction, States can
prosecute an offence as representatives of others
States, even if the criminal conduct is an offence
in the territorial state and the extradition are
impossible. The possibility to prosecute an
offence doesn’t depend by the nature of crime.
Although the Forum State represents the territorial
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State, the form State applies its own law, not the
other law. The main difference, in fact, between
universal jurisdiction and vicarious administration
of justice lies in the aim of the two forms of
jurisdiction: when the States exercise
representational jurisdiction, they protect the
interests of the territorial States; on the opposite,
the States that exercise universal jurisdiction,
protect the interests of international community or
of humanity as a whole75.
Another difference regards the field and the
requirement of application: the vicarious
administrations of justice also apply to lesser
crimes and its exercise is subject to the double
criminality and the evidence of impossible
extradition76.
When does this margin of national discretion to
adapt those certain/general rules to the local/legal
tradition change in fragmentation?
It depends upon how the domestic legal order
cope the processes of internationalization or better
globalization of international criminal law and
how the States look at the problems confronted in
terms of unity and coherence of their systems. The
fragmentation in the implementation of universal
jurisdiction would be increased: a substantial
fragmentation with reference to the human rights
selected as the crimes that concern the Humanity
as whole; a procedural fragmentation with
reference to the different tribunals (national and
international) deputy to judge the core crimes; a
geographical fragmentation, related to the
relationship between the own national order and
any other legal order, a growing asymmetry
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 See the Dutch law referring to article 4 a paragraph 1
criminal code, article 552 hh Code on Criminal
procedure, article 2 International crimes act 2003.
among democratic governments, states, territories,
nationalities, sovereignties and legitimacy who
concerns the rule of law. The unity as far as the
different manifestations of jurisdiction also in this
case concerns the dialectics between international
and national systems, the reasoning between
legality and power.  The fragmentation in all these
cases could have two effects: one negative,
because of the dispersion of legal order, that
pitfalls the credibility and the authority of
international law, as far as the substantive
criminal law is concerned (with reference to the
elements of crimes we have faced different
definitions or regimes of applications relating to
the same issue), and one positive, as authoritative
doctrine affirms, as far as the vitality of
international law, because of the proliferations of
rules, laws, decisions might strengthen the
criminal law system. In front of a plurality of
solutions we can choose the best plan.
5. Concluding remarks. Universal jurisdiction
in translation.
 As I hope to have made clear herein, it is evident
that the concept of unity in respect to universal
jurisdiction cannot be assessed with the same
measures as one would apply to a domestic civil
law system.
As a project, universal jurisdiction is subject to
mediation.  It reflects the transformation of
universal values into universal law; principles of
normative behaviour come to acquire positive
legal status. The primary tension affecting the
global application of universal jurisdiction is
represented by the conflict between the moral
claims of human rights norms and the political
reality of global justice. This has become evident
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in the fact that international crimes occur daily
and take place in every country.
Despite this contradiction, the idea of universal
jurisdiction governing human rights has inspired
the creation of many laws, norms, institutions,
declarations, and the proliferation of ideas. The
principle has entered an evolutionary phase”
which is characterised by a transition from
international to cosmopolitan norm of justice”77.
As it evolves, universal jurisdiction could
represent a “cosmopolitan” norm, a dynamic
process through which the principles of human
rights are progressively incorporated into the
positive laws of democratic States78. In this paper
we have analysed where and how universal
jurisdiction has been applied, and we have
demonstrated evidence of diversification of the
concept from a legal point of view.
A new process of norm creation is emerging.
Through repeated engagement with human rights
norms barriers can be removed and boundaries
can be redrawn within existing democracies. As
one commentator has noted, in the global
environment of universal jurisdiction, “the
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In the same direction D.F. Orentlicher, Whose Justice?
Reconciling Universal Jurisdiction with Democratic
Principles, in International Law and International
Relations: Bridging Theory and Practice, above, at
207-8.
contradiction between the universalism of ethics
and the particularity of law can never be fully
transcended but only progressively ameliorated in
time”79.
The process of (re)creating universal jurisdiction
and of changing (non)existent laws in the project
of supporting human rights norms and global
justice requires constant (re)negotiation and
redefinition between political governments and
organisations and juridical guidelines and
enactments. The concept of universal jurisdiction
will naturally be segmented until it realises a
coherent legal status. This could be happen though
an iterative democratic process – a process of
“linguistic, legal, cultural and political repetitions
in-transformation which not only change
established understandings but also transform
what passes as valid”80. It is in this manner that
progressive normative and legal change take
place. Hence, through repeated engagement with
and redefinition of certain norms new mores and
social practices are created. We can advance the
real implementation and application of universal
jurisdiction, moving in the direction of a process
of jurisgenerative politics, which “includes the
augmentation of the meaning of rights claims and
the growth of the political authorship by ordinary
individuals” in order ultimately to lead to a
politics of inclusion81. Cosmopolitan principle
must inevitably collide with the boundaries
required by democratic authority.  Universal
jurisdiction is neither merely moral nor just legal,
nor is it framed in a global rather than domestic
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context. Also on stigmatizing the crimes against
humanity in a legal and political context, the State
have ‘created’ unprecedented (legislative and
practicing) act. Now it is only a matter of time.
Governments will eventually recognise, through
legalisation and juridification, the rights claims of
human beings everywhere, regardless of their
membership in bounded communities.
And we, as intended intellectuals, have the duty to
ensure that, in the absence of a global criminal
system of law, in the absence of international
democratic global order, that the universal justice
of human rights, while imperfect, fragmented, and
not completely defined, is, perhaps, the one most
readily realised at the moment.
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